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Deutsche Geschichte von der Auflösung des alten bis zur Errichtung des neuen Kaiserreiches, (1806-1871). Von H. v. ZWIEDINECK-SÜDENHORST, Professor of History at the University of Graz. Dritter Band: *Die Lösung der deutschen Frage und das Kaisertum der Hohenzollern, 1849-1871.* (Stuttgart and Berlin: J. G. Cotta'sche Buchhandlung Nachfolger. 1905. Pp. x, 504.)
La Fondation de l'Empire Allemand, 1852-1871. Par ERNEST DENIS, Professeur d'Histoire Contemporaine à l'Université de Paris. (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin. 1906. Pp. viii, 528.)

THE first of these books is the concluding volume of a work to which the author has given a decade of labor, and which has already been recognized as the most important effort at general treatment in this field since Sybel. The author, for some time back the chief editor of the reorganized "Bibliothek Deutscher Geschichte" (in which this work appears), may be regarded as the leading Austrian representative of the school of Sybel; and those who look to his pages for any considerable departure from the orthodox Prussian points of view will be disappointed. Austrian nationality and feeling are to be presumed in the alumnus and teacher of the University of Graz, and are indeed evident; but it is "Das Herz Deutsch-Oesterreichs, das deutsche Herz" of which Hamerling sings that guides his pen—the German feeling that looks over the border with bitter regrets and could, we suspect, be brought with no great difficulty to sacrifice Magyar-Slav association to the blotting out of that border. Nor does the author take any particular pains to conceal or moderate his political feelings; in his preface he tells us that

der Darsteller, der darauf ausgehen würde, objektiv zu erzählen, würde es niemandem recht machen und alle langweilen. Wir sind insgesamt mit so vielen intimen Fäden an die nächste Vergangenheit gebunden, dass wir bei der Betrachtung der jüngsten Geschehnisse unser Gefühl nicht gänzlich zum Schweigen bringen können . . . Es gibt keine Geschichte der Gegenwart . . . Indem ich in diesem dritten Bande an die Ereignisse von 1866 und 1870 herantrat, erkannte ich mit Bestimmtheit, dass hier die Gewinnung des historischen Standpunktes nur zum Teile gelingen kann.

This frank statement would be ill-requited by an undue insistence on the numerous instances in which the author's pen has betrayed his predilections, and the reviewer feels more inclined to point out that the book is to be taken much more seriously than these words might lead one to suppose. If it is not a "definitive" history of the period (which its author disclaims any hope of producing), it is in the main a full and judicious treatment of the political development, guided by the most approved methods and based on thorough study. The proportioning indeed is not always satisfactory, but the facts are well marshalled, the emphasis good, the language clear and effective; we doubt if there can

be found anywhere more lucid statements of the political and diplomatic situations or of the military operations. These are great merits; but there are also serious defects.

Apart from the confessed and almost unavoidable defect in objectivity, many students will find the book fundamentally unsatisfactory because of the limited point of view and range of interest represented. The narrative is practically a purely political and military one and, even when taken in connection with the earlier volumes, is marked by a neglect of non-political aspects and of mass-elements and developments in general that betrays a close adherence to methods now somewhat discredited. Of this of course we were warned in Zwiedineck-Südenhorst's preface to his first volume; but the intervening years have only increased the objections to this manner of presenting history. Even when the author deals with the Zollverein (in his second volume as in this), he does so mainly from the diplomatic point of view. This volume gives no attention to economic development; practically none is given to literature or the press, to religion or art. Educational conditions are not mentioned, and there seems to be an entire unconsciousness of the claims to investigation or presentation of public spirit or opinion even from the purely political point of view. If the book mentions Lassalle, the reviewer has not noticed it. It is clear that Zwiedineck-Südenhorst is interested only in the crises, the moments of the acceleration or explosion of historical forces, and only in the individuals who take leadership at such moments; interested in them as individuals, as standing on their own feet and through individual power controlling or modifying events. It is in accord with this line of treatment that so little space (practically only pp. 158-166) is given to the comparatively uneventful years 1851-1859; it is clear however that even from the personal and political point of view this is inadequate. That all this indicates a determined adherence to the point of view of the preface of ten years ago is shown in the declaration (p. 371) that

Die Zeit vom 4. bis 26. Juli [1866] ist reicher an diplomatischen Verwickelungen und Szenenwechseln als irgend eine Epoche der Geschichte Europas und sie ist vor allem dadurch bemerkenswert geworden, dass ihre Ereignisse fast ausschliesslich in den Charakteren der handelnden Personen ihre Begründung finden, dass Individualitäten und nicht Kollektivkräfte dabei ausschlaggebend geworden sind.

Historical students who find themselves involved in the complexities and obscurities of mass-factors can only envy the capacity at this day of proceeding upon such comfortable convictions.

The defects of this work will appear the more strongly when it is compared with the recent book by Denis on precisely the same period. The volumes naturally suggest comparison with respect to methods and points of view (especially as the element of nationality enters), and it will perhaps be not amiss for the reviewer to devote himself mainly to these aspects. M. Denis is also an academic historian and a prolific

writer of established standing, and in his preface he too makes confessions. His object is stated to be "donner un tableau général de la vie de l'Allemagne de 1851 à 1871, en étudier les divers côtés, politique, littéraire, économique, et indiquer ainsi les conditions qui ont préparé et déterminé la formation de l'Unité germanique". He might be thinking of Zwiedineck-Südenhorst when he protests against the writers who "exagèrent l'action des héros sur l'évolution du monde", and declares "que les accidents ne prennent d'importance que s'ils sont la conclusion et la sanction d'un long développement antérieur, et que les héros n'apparaissent et n'exercent d'action réelle que si les conditions générales les préparent et les soutiennent". The power of a Bismarck "ne s'explique que parce qu'il est la vivante synthèse de désirs infinis et de lointaines aspirations". In regard to political development he will try "de montrer, au milieu des incidents diplomatiques de portée secondaire, les causes lointaines et profondes qui expliquent l'attitude des cabinets et les déconvenues de leur politique". All this seems neither very unfamiliar nor very shocking, and we are rather surprised when M. Denis proceeds to say, "Je ne me dissimule pas combien cette conception de l'histoire s'éloigne de l'histoire dite scientifique qui est aujourd'hui en faveur", and announces that he will "indiquer nettement cette divergence" by suppressing all his notes. There would seem to be here something of inconsequence, and a writer of less standing would perhaps be exposed to some suspicion. But though the careful reader will frequently regret the absence of notes and references (in one instance, p. 317, a very important and definite promise of territorial compensation to France in 1866 is attributed to Bismarck without precise date or authority), and will be constantly irritated by obscurity and lack of precision in quotation, he will not fail to recognize the work of the serious student and to see that the author has a wide acquaintance with the best material. M. Denis also disclaims full objectivity, though not so strongly as Zwiedineck-Südenhorst; on the whole his narrative seems less marred by his prejudices.

As he fulfils his promise of presenting strongly the mass-factors, M. Denis's book forms an admirable complement to the other; how this is so, even in Zwiedineck-Südenhorst's own field, will be seen by comparing the treatment of military matters. The general European situations are given much more attention by Denis, though on the whole he keeps more closely to his subject than does the Austrian (who, for example, gives too much space to Austro-Italian warfare). Though emphasizing collective aspects, Denis by no means neglects the individual; indeed the great personalities of the time loom out of his animated pages more strongly than from those of the companion work. This is due largely to the degree in which he indulges his unusual talent for characterization, lavishing it at times on individuals of comparatively little importance. This is coupled often with a yielding to the tendencies of the natural gossip and raconteur, and is set off by a

gift of phrase and epigram that is not always sufficiently under control. One can understand why M. Denis is one of the most popular of French academic lecturers, and is led to surmise that the printed page has not always sufficiently felt the repentances of the proof-reading stage. One of the least agreeable manifestations of these characteristics is the Gallic sneer that frequently seems irrepressible; as when at the end of a passage of generous appreciation with respect to the National Association of 1859, he adds, "gymnastes, tireurs, orphéonistes, savants, d'un bout à l'autre du territoire, se grisaient de bière et d'éloquence" (p. 230), or speaks of King William in 1866 as still in need "de quelques mois pour rassurer sa conscience et pour mettre Jéhovah de son côté" (p. 322).

An instructive standpoint for the comparison of these books is with respect to their attitude toward the victorious Prussian. Both writers are strongly appreciative, surprisingly generous in their concessions; but while the language of the Frenchman is frequently the more unreserved, the feeling of the Deutsch-Oesterreicher is unquestionably the more sincere. Zwiedineck-Südenhorst's Austrian spirit is betrayed in his intense bitterness against those (as Schwarzenberg and Beust) whom he regards as responsible for the mismanagement of Austrian interests in the building up of the new Germany; in the humiliated regret with which he acknowledges that Austria deserved defeat; in the exultation of his narrative of the Austrian defeats of Italy in 1866; throughout his whole narrative of the Prussian advance, however, he vies with Sybel and Treitschke in unflinching justification and approval, and hardly lets us detect that his point of view is German rather than Prussian (see his denunciation of Hannoverian politics, pp. 159 and 330; also his rhapsody over the sacred union of hearts between Bismarck and King William, p. 243). He rarely controverts Sybel or questions the finality of the *Gedanken und Erinnerungen*. Part of the explanation of this is doubtless to be found in the sympathy with Prussian internal polity of the born conservative and aristocrat (see his frequent denunciations of both Prussian and Austrian liberalism, as pp. 224, 237, 268), and in the present conditions of Austrian politics. Denis, on the other hand, while making every concession to Prussian astuteness and efficiency, and at times using extravagant language (as when he speaks, p. 297, of the "sublime esthétique" of the Moltke mobilization of 1870), frequently turns on the Teutonic conqueror with a bitter gibe or disingenuously plucks away his laurels by excessive and undignified condemnation of those with whom he had to do (as when, p. 302, after acknowledging the mastery of Bismarck in the Schleswig-Holstein matter, he points out his good luck, especially in that Napoleon was "un illuminé, Gortchakov un fat, les ministres anglais des poltrons et Rechberg un sot"). One suspects further that what is real in the Frenchman's admiration of Prussia is largely a real sympathy with the materially successful, a genuine acceptance of the lessons as to worldly efficiency that France

had been taught; of the criticisms of Moltke's Bohemian campaign he remarks, "Il est vain ensuite et puéril de s'inscrire en faux contre le succès" (p. 338).

We must refrain from following these writers into any of the many disputed episodes of these critical years. But it is difficult to refrain from comparing them with regard to that culminating and much-disputed event, the outbreak of war between France and Prussia. And the net result of the comparison is perhaps to show how near together have come the more enlightened minds. After stating clearly the conflicting national views, Zwiedineck-Südenhorst declares that "kann man doch mit voller Bestimmtheit aussprechen, dass weder die volkstümliche französische, noch die volkstümliche deutsche Anschauung richtig ist. Jede von ihnen leidet an innerer Unwahrheit" (p. 431). While there was a French court party desirous of war, the emperor remained convinced of the Prussian military superiority; while Bismarck had at first welcomed and worked for the Hohenzollern candidacy as likely to improve the Prussian position, he did not aim to bring on war thus with France, did not expect it to be thus brought on, and was not the leading spirit in the last phase of it; the sensitiveness of the French and the weakness of the emperor produced the war-situation, and when in the situation a final controlling opportunity fell to Bismarck, "er hat den Krieg gemacht . . . ; er hat aus den Falten der Toga, in die sich die preussische Regierung nach den Emser Vorgängen hüllen konnte, die Kriegsfalte fallen lassen" (p. 445), publishing the news from Ems in such a form as in view of the national feeling in both countries would be sure to precipitate the war. Denis on his part acknowledges to the full the mistakes of the French government, but denies that Napoleon in the years 1867-1870 was steadily trying to form a war-coalition against Prussia. "En dernière analyse", he says (p. 458), "si Bismarck rechercha la rupture, il y fut en quelque sorte contraint par le gouvernement français qui s'obstinait à se mettre en travers de sa route, tandis que l'Empereur qui redoutait la guerre, la rendit inévitable en se refusant à accepter les conditions sans lesquelles une entente durable était impossible." Bismarck, believing the war inevitable, deliberately brought it about through the Hohenzollern candidacy (which however he did not regard as making it certain), and it would have required great coolness and good sense on the part of the French government to keep the French people "de se jeter tête baissée dans le piège qui lui était tendu" (p. 459). If Bismarck had had his way, the matter would have been so managed by stealing a march on France that if war resulted Prussia would have had Spain as an ally; on the failure of this it is the mismanagement of the French government that brings the affair to such a pass as to make it again the best of occasions for the war, and Bismarck then again seizes upon the situation and purposely makes peace impossible through the brutal ultimatum form that he gives the Ems telegram.

It will appear from this that it would be a very delicate matter indeed to discriminate between the degrees of responsibility attached by the two writers to Bismarck. The most direct and serious disagreement between them is with regard to the factor of public feeling in France and Germany. Zwiedineck-Südenhorst declares that the whole French people must bear the responsibility, no serious effort having been made in any quarter to prevent the war; while Denis maintains that the German historians who say that French public feeling wanted war deceive themselves "volontairement ou non". With regard to German feeling, "die laute Zustimmung zur That von Ems" (p. 447) is to the Austrian a holy emotion, which he is proud to reflect that the Deutsch-Oesterreicher shared; to Denis the German outcry was due largely to the production by the university teaching of a youth that "n'a qu'un credo: la conviction de la supériorité de la vertu et de la science germaniques; qu'une religion: la force; qu'un besoin: la domination" (p. 471).

Neither of these books can be said to add much to our knowledge of the period, and it is not to be expected that they should. The careful reader will not be always in agreement with either, but will acknowledge both to be good summaries, useful especially for the general reader and in showing the student the present state of our information in this field. Neither claims to be presenting a definitive history, and both seem in consequence to feel more or less of irresponsibility as to the expression of personal views. Denis is on the whole quite as trustworthy as Zwiedineck-Südenhorst, and is much more brilliant and suggestive; there are more gaps, however, in his narrative, and he does not follow the political development as carefully. Unhappily neither volume is provided with an index.

VICTOR COFFIN.

A History of Modern England. By HERBERT PAUL. In five volumes. Volume V. (New York: The Macmillan Company; London: Macmillan and Company. 1906. Pp. vi, 405.)

THE fifth and last volume of Mr. Paul's *History of Modern England* begins with June 8, 1885, "a memorable day in English history . . . from [which] all subsequent events in this History take in some degree their colour." It was, in fact, the day on which Mr. Gladstone announced to the queen his defeat in the momentous general election of that year. The ensuing narrative concludes with Mr. Campbell-Bannerman's "shut[ting] up his box with a snap" (p. 268), resigning his office, and thus forcing the general election of 1895, which, like that of a decade before, brought defeat to the Liberal party. The preceding volume concerned itself with Imperialism and Ireland. The present volume is dominated by the course of the Irish question in English politics by which it first disrupted and then overthrew the Liberal party. It is, in brief, the tragedy of Home Rule, and it ends in doubt if not in despair. The only relief comes in the suggestions which abound, that